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Abstract
We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect pro-
duction but are not separately veriﬁable and where the manager (principal)
and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be
carried out: agents prefer a less efﬁcient way of production. We show that by
dividing labour (assigning tasks to different agents and verifying that agents
do not carry out tasks to which they are not assigned), it is possible for the
principal to implement the efﬁcient way of production. Colluding agents can
undermine this implementation. However, if agents have different abilities,
collusion can be prevented by a speciﬁc assignment of agents to tasks.
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1 Introduction
In many economic situations, little is known about how an outcome, goal or pro-
duction result has been achieved. For example, the success of a marketing oper-
ation may be increased by more creativity or a better-identiﬁed target audience.
Exam results can be improved by augmenting the quality of teaching or by train-
ing test situations with the students. A smooth table surface can be achieved by
meticulously levelling the wood or by adding an extra layer of paint. The likeli-
hoodofplacinganunemployedintoajobisaffectedbytrainingherinademanded
profession or by brushing up her interview skills. Software may run well due to
particularly careful programming or due to extensive debugging. Although, it is
hard or even impossible to deduce how the observed result has been produced,
it may nevertheless be important. Some ways of producing might be more efﬁ-
cient than others. A particular mix of targeting and creativity may bind customers
longer. Students should not just learn how to cope with test situations but also
receive quality teaching. The table may be more durable if the right amount of
levelling and painting are applied. Too much focus on interview skills does not
improve the match between labour demand and labour supply. Finally, it may be
easier to maintain software when more emphasis has been put on careful program-
ming. If the person who carries out the work (agent, worker, he) does not prefer
to produce the result efﬁciently, there is a need for the person who organises pro-
duction (principal, manager, she) to inﬂuence the activity and direct production
to improve efﬁciency. But how can production be directed if it is not possible to
verify what exactly the agent did?
The question how to organise production has a long tradition which starts with
Adam Smith (1776) and encompasses Taylor’s idea (1911) of “scientiﬁc manage-
ment”. Taylor was interested to identify the “one best method” to achieve a par-
ticular production goal. Here, we are concerned with the question how “one best
method” can be implemented in a sparse contractual environment. We analyse a
multiple-task setting, where tasks contribute to a production result, which is the
only veriﬁable measure of effort. There is no additional information about the
1effort of individual agents or the effort exerted at speciﬁc tasks which can be con-
tracted upon. The tasks are not conﬂicting with respect to the production result:
effort on any task is (weakly) beneﬁcial and (weakly) increases the production
result. The principal cares about how the production result has been achieved, but
this cannot be deduced from the result itself. If multiple agents are employed, she
can assign them to tasks and ensure that they do not carry out tasks to which they
are not assigned. In other words, it is possible to divide labour.
We show that the division of labour enables the principal to direct production: by
assigning one task to each agent, the principal can inﬂuence how much effort is
exerted at each task. The intuition is the following. Without division of labour, the
agent has many ways to affect the production result. If labour is divided, an agent
can only inﬂuence the production result by changing the effort on his task. The
performance pay to this agent thus allows to directly manipulate his gains from
exerting effort. By adjusting these gains, the principal can obtain any desired ef-
fort level. As this is possible for every task and agent, any effort allocation can be
obtained.
This result provides a novel explanation for the division of labour. Gains of sepa-
rating tasks between workers are usually attributed to economies of scale or com-
parative advantages or combinations of both. Our explanation complements these
rationales: separating tasks may create gains even if it neither enables agents to
master individual tasks in a better way nor allows to exploit differences in skills.
The key element for implementing the efﬁcient production method is that agents
are prevented from doing the tasks of other agents. Otherwise, they would obtain
production results by exerting effort on their preferred task. But even if agents
cannot do these tasks themselves, they can potentially undermine the directions
of the principal by colluding: they may talk to their colleague on the respective
task and agree to produce the result with the lowest joint costs rather than in the
most efﬁcient way. We examine the possibility of collusion and ﬁnd that the prin-
cipal can avoid collusion by assigning workers to tasks according to ability. The
required assignment is not necessarily in line with the idea of a comparative ad-
vantage. Thus, the prediction from our model differs from that of classical ideas
of specialisation.
The result offers a new perspective on the problem of providing incentives when
there are multiple task. This problem has ﬁrst been formalised in a seminal article
2by Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991). Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom assume that effort
at different tasks is measured with different accuracy, while we consider situations
where task-wise information is not revealed but only the overall production result
is contractible. Since tasks are measured with different accuracy in Holmstr¨ om
and Milgrom’s model, there is a conﬂict between incentives to optimally allocate
effort and insurance considerations. Under our assumption, the incentive problem
arises from a different source: the production result does not reﬂect how effort has
been allocated across tasks. Hence, it cannot be employed to obtain the desired
allocation. Note, that this only hinges on the fact that the measure confounds the
effort on several tasks - so the problem remains even if the production result is
measured without error. Confounding performance measures have received con-
siderable attention in recent contributions to the multi-tasking literature (Feltham
and Xie 1994, Baker 2002, Schnedler 2003 and 2004). While these authors deal
withtheeffectofthecompositionofperformancemeasuresonhowajobiscarried
out, they do not consider other organisational responses to inﬂuence the agent’s
behaviour. In particular, they neglect the possibility of dividing tasks between
agents. Like here, Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) examine the effect of dividing
labour in a situation where the only veriﬁable outcome depends on the effort ex-
erted at two tasks. Differently, they assume that the effort on one task increases
this outcome while the other effort reduces it. This assumption makes sense if the
outcome is a decision and effort is exerted to gather information for and against
this decision (advocacy setting). It is less suitable for most production settings,
where beneﬁcial effort affects the outcome in the same direction, irrespective on
which task it is exerted. By assuming such non-conﬂicting efforts, we depart from
Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) at a crucial point. This departure has several con-
sequences. First, incentives in Dewatripont and Tirole’s article can be produced
by introducing competition between agents. These become adversary advocates.
On the contrary, when tasks are non-conﬂicting, agents become non-competing
co-workers. Second, because the advocates compete, they also have a motive to
sabotage the work of the other – a negative side-effect which is absent from our
setting. Finally, collusion can never be prevented with conﬂicting efforts: advo-
cates jointly gain by ending their competition and slacking on effort. In our setting
collusion can sometimes be avoided. In order to enable an agent to slack, the other
agent will have to work for him. If this agent has high effort costs, they cannot
improve their joint situation by undermining the incentive scheme.
When the production result is the only variable which reﬂects effort on various
tasks, dividing labour implies that a group of agents is paid according to a joint
3performance measure. In principle, such arrangements are vulnerable to free-
riding. Holmstr¨ om (1982) has shown that the free-rider problem does not occur
if the principal acts as a budget breaker (as in our setting). Holmstr¨ om as well
as Alchian and Demsetz (1972) study the provision of incentives taking the ex-
istence of the team as given. Alchian and Demsetz justify the existence of the
team by interactions in the production function. Itoh (1991) also motivates why
multiple agents work on one task. In his article, effort costs are convex at each
task and additively separable between tasks; hence, agents prefer splitting their
effort between two tasks rather than concentrating it. Here, there are no reasons
neither on the production nor on the cost side which favour multiple agents. Still,
we ﬁnd that having multiple agents improves efﬁciency. We thus provide a justi-
ﬁcation for the existence of teams deﬁned solely by reward systems. Such teams
do indeed exist. An example are the team-based bonus schemes piloted recently
in three government agencies in the United Kingdom (Burgess and Ratto 2003).
While we examine the effect of division of labour in a multiple task setting with a
confounding measure, such measures also appear in other contexts. One example
are career concern models (Fama 1980, Holmstr¨ om 1999, Gibbons and Murphy
1992). Dewatripont, Jewitt, andTirole(1999)considerorganisationalresponsesto
separate talent from effort in these models. Another example is the simultaneous
decision on a project and effort. Athey and Roberts (2001) suggest that a hierar-
chical structure improves incentives in this setting. Intuitively, several agents may
be more productive than fewer because some of them are hired as supervisors and
control the activity of the others. Strausz (1997) has shown elegantly that an in-
termediary between principal and agent can improve incentives in a single task
setting, even if this intermediary has to base judgements on the same information
as the principal. In our model, incentives are also improved but not because an
agent is monitoring or controlling his colleagues or acting as an intermediary.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section sets up the
model. Then, in Section 3, we derive the optimal contract with a single worker
and when labour is divided. In Section 4, we discuss when collusion may occur
and how it can be prevented by a speciﬁc task assignment. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
42 The model
We illustrate the idea that division of labour allows to direct production in a very
simple framework. Consider a principal, who draws a beneﬁt from two tasks
one of which is easy (task E) and the other demanding (task D). Lacking time or
skills to do the tasks herself, the principal employs one or two agents to do the job.
Each task involves an effort choice by agent i who carries out the task: eD
i and
eE
i .1 Later, we want to discuss deviations of the agents from some optimal inner
solution. For agents to be able to deviate in both directions, there need to be at
least three possible choices: ek
i ∈{0,1,2},k =D,E. The costs of effort exerted by
agent i at task k rise with effort ck
i(0) < ck
i(1) < ck







Convexity of costs will be crucial for the implementation of the optimal contract,
as we shall consider below. We assume that the costs of effort at the two tasks are
independent. This assumption ensures that there are no cost advantages or disad-
vantages of employing more or less agents.2 Consequently, any division of labour
is driven entirely by incentive effects and not by economies of scale or scope.
We want to represent that task D is more demanding, by assuming the following.
When the effort level is low at the difﬁcult task, an increase in effort is more costly
than an increase in effort on the easy task starting from a medium level:
cD
i (1)−cD
i (0) > cE
i (2)−cE
i (1). (2)
This assumption introduces an asymmetry in the agents’ preferences about how
tasks are carried out relative to the principal’s interest. This asymmetry will play
a crucial role to explain why efﬁcient production cannot be achieved with a single
agent. From the convexity assumption (1) and the task asymmetry assumption (2),
it follows immediately that increasing effort is more costly on the demanding task
whatever the initial level:
cD
i (1)−cD
i (0) > cE
i (1)−cE
i (0) and cD
i (2)−cD
i (1) > cE
i (2)−cE
i (1). (3)
1More generally, the agent may not exert effort but have a choice which affects himself as well
as the principal. However, ordering these choices according to costs and speaking of effort greatly
simpliﬁes the exposition.
2We do not claim that those advantages do not occur in reality but we want to abstract from
them to isolate incentive effects.
5In other words, the agent has a preference for increasing effort on the easy rather
than on the difﬁcult task.
Theprincipalisnotindifferentabouthoweffortisallocatedbetweentasks, neither.
For simplicity, we assume that the principal is satisﬁed as long as medium effort
is chosen at each task. Thus, the principal’s beneﬁt B(eD
i ,eE










Hence, there is a conﬂict of interest between principal and agent. The principal
wants at least medium effort on both tasks while the agent prefers to concentrate
his effort on the easier task.
The problem is only interesting, if the interaction between principal and agents
can potentially be beneﬁcial. Thus, we assume that the beneﬁt exceeds the effort




It follows from this and the other model assumptions that it is efﬁcient to imple-
ment a medium level of effort on both tasks. Choosing a higher effort level on any
of the tasks only leads to higher costs while a lower level eliminates the beneﬁt.
Note that the agent on his own would choose an inefﬁcient way of production. So,
there is scope to increase efﬁciency. Hence, an intervention to direct the agent’s
effort may make sense.
If the input of the agent on each task could be veriﬁed by a court, the principal
and the agent would write a contract to stipulate the efﬁcient medium effort levels.
This contract would then work as a device to direct the agent’s effort. However,
we assume that contracts about task-wise efforts cannot be written. The only in-
formation about the agent’s effort which may be used in court is the production
result. Anything that reveals how the ﬁnal product has been generated (for ex-
ample intermediate stages of production) cannot be veriﬁed. The principal may
believe or even know that production has not taken place in the desired way but
she cannot credibly relay this information to other parties. She may also be aware
of the beneﬁt she has received (or not) but again she is unable to “prove” this sub-
jective quantity. The behaviour of the agent may eventually even become apparent
but it may be too late because the agent cannot be held responsible anymore. So,
6neither the desired actions nor the consequences for the principal can be stipulated
and the contractual environment we consider is that of a ”coping organisation” ac-
cording to Wilson (1989). Summarising these considerations, we assume that the
only veriﬁable quantity is a measure that is increasing in both efforts but does not
allow to identify how the worker allocates effort between the two tasks. We as-
sume that the production result “looks good” (M = 1) if the sum of the two efforts










i ≥ 2. (6)
The effort allocation across tasks cannot be identiﬁed even if the observable pro-
duction result M is not noisy. Of course, the allocation would still remain uniden-
tiﬁed if the production result were noisy. Also, the fact that the production re-
sult takes two values is not crucial either. Even if the production result were a
continuous function of continuous effort, it would still not be possible to iden-
tify task-wise efforts. The distinguishing and important feature of the veriﬁable
production result used here is that it increases in both efforts and (by nature) is
one-dimensional, so that effort on a speciﬁc task cannot be deduced. Because the
veriﬁable result confounds effort on both tasks, a court of law cannot tell whether
the agent allocated effort across tasks in the speciﬁc way desired by the principal.
In particular, the agent can mask low effort on one task by higher effort on the
other task. This is harmful to a principal who prefers a speciﬁc effort allocation.
Figure 1 illustrates the situation under our simple assumptions. Essentially, the
result looks good whenever the principal receives a beneﬁt. However, there are
two important exceptions: exerting a lot of effort on either task masks a low effort
on the other task.
The veriﬁable production result gives the principal an instrument to provide in-
centives. She can set two transfers depending on the state: a transfer ¯ ti which is
paid whenever the production result is high (M = 1) and ti which is handed to the
agent i given the result is low (M = 0).
3 Optimal contract
We will now examine the optimal contract in the described model framework.
First, we will restrict the principal to only employ one agent. Then, we will relax





























The same veriﬁable result can be obtained in beneﬁcial or damaging ways.
this assumption.
To ﬁnd the optimal contract, we assume that the principal is the mechanism de-
signerandthattherationalityoftheagentisrepresentedintheformofanincentive
constraint. A participation constraint ensures that the principal does actually cre-
ate surplus and is not simply exploiting the agents. For simplicity, the outside
option of all agents is standardised to zero.
3.1 One-agent case
If the principal can only employ one agent, she will maximise the joint surplus



















i ) ≥ 0.
(7)
Because the high production result can be observed when the agent chooses the
desired middle level on both tasks, a ﬁrst intuition might be to reward the agent
8for the high result. However, if the agent is rewarded for a good looking product,
he will produce it in the cheapest and not necessarily in the best way. Indeed,
production will be inadequate at the demanding task and the agent will mask this
inadequacy with the easy task. Formally, the following result holds:
Proposition 1 (Window-dressing by a single agent). If there is a single agent i
and transfers are set to enable efﬁcient production (eD
i =1,eE
i =1), the agent will
engage in cheap window dressing (eD
i = 0,eE
i = 2).
Proof. To implement efﬁcient production, it is necessary to meet the incentive
constraint and pay the agent sufﬁciently much so that he exerts the medium rather





choice whether to generate a high or a low result. The high result can be generated







are strictly dominated by (eD
i = 1,eE
i = 1). It is not proﬁtable to reduce effort















i (0) > cD
i (1)+cE
i (1). On the other hand, reducing effort





i (1)byequation(2). Thus, thecheapestwaytoproduce
the high result is cheap window dressing (eD
i =0,eE
i =2), and yields: ¯ ti−cE
i (2)−
cD
i (0). For a low result, exerting low effort, (eD
i = 0,eE
i = 0), strictly dominates
the other options, (eD
i = 0,eE
i = 1) and (eD
i = 1,eE
i = 0). It costs cE
i (0)+cD
i (0)
and leaves the agent with ti−cE
i (0)+cD
i (0). Because transfers are set to enable









i (0) = cE
i (2), so that the agent maximises his surplus
by generating the high result through cheap window dressing.
The main message of this proposition is that any attempt to achieve the efﬁcient
production is doomed because incentives lead the agent to prefer a different al-
location of effort across tasks. More speciﬁcally, he rather slacks on the difﬁcult
task and brushes up the appearance on the easy task. The crucial feature of the
contractible outcome, which drives this result, is that it is not a perfect represen-
tation of the principal’s gains from production and it confounds the efforts of two
(non-conﬂicting) tasks. The production result looks better irrespective of where
effort is concentrated, and this opens up the opportunity for the agent to window-
9dress.3 Note that it is the problem of identifying effort on tasks at the heart of the
matter here. This problem can also exist if the veriﬁable production result is noisy,
and effort is continuous. As long as it matters on which task the agent exerts how
much effort and as long as this cannot be identiﬁed by looking at the production
result, window-dressing is possible.
Principal and agent foresee that the agent engages in window dressing rather than
delivering the desired product. As providing incentives is costly but produces no
beneﬁt, the principal gives up on incentives.
Proposition 2 (No incentive provision). In the single agent case, it is optimal to




Proof. The agent will produce the high result by window dressing as long as ¯ ti−
ti ≥ cE
i (2)−cE
i (0). If ¯ ti−ti < cE
i (2)−cE
i (0), the agent will not produce the high
result but the low result. The respective costs, beneﬁt, and losses are zero, while
window dressing leads to a loss. So, it is optimal not to provide incentives.
The ability of the agent to cover up bad performance on the demanding task by a
good performance on the easy task undermines any well-meant incentive scheme.
Ofcourse, theprincipalcouldalsostopwindow-dressingbynotallowingtheagent
to perform the easy task. But then, she will also fail to achieve efﬁcient production
which requires some input on each task. A possibility for the principal to get
round this problem is to assign the easy task to another agent. This avenue will be
explored in what follows.
3.2 Two-agent case
When there are multiple agents, the principal can assign speciﬁc tasks to each
agent. A central assumption of our model is that the principal cannot enforce ef-
fort choices using contracts. However, the principal may well be able to prevent
agents from working on tasks to which they were not assigned. This can be done
by withholding material or instruments needed for this task, not granting access
to a locality at which the task has to be performed, or not training or preparing
3A more in-depth discussion of the relationship between contractible performance measure and
principal’s gains and its consequences on the allocation of effort between tasks can be found in
Schnedler 2004.
10the worker to carry out the task. Also, it may be possible for the principal to pro-
vide evidence that a worker was doing something he was not supposed to do, even
though she cannot prove that an agent is not doing what he should do. Whatever,
the reason may be, we assume for the following that the principal can prevent
agents from exerting effort on tasks which are not assigned to them. If the prin-
cipal has this “power”, she can ensure that one agent is working only on the easy
task and the other one is only working on the difﬁcult task.
If different agents are working at the two tasks, this induces a game between agent
i and agent j and the maximisation programme is:
max
¯ ti,ti,¯ tj,t j
b(eD
i ,eE









i ) ≥ 0
as well as (¯ tj−t j)·M(eD
i ,eE
j )+t j−cE(eE
j ) ≥ 0.
(8)
In case that the same agent works at both tasks (i = j), the game degenerates to
the decision problem described in the incentive constraint in the programme (7).
Table 1: Payoff matrix of agent i (row) and j (column)
Agent j (working on easy task)
0 1 2
0 (ti−cD
i (0),t j −cE
j (0)) (ti−cD
i (0),t j −cE
j (1)) (¯ ti−cD




i (1),t j −cE
j (0)) (¯ ti−cD
i (1),¯ tj −cE
j (1)) (¯ ti−cD




i (2),¯ tj −cE
j (0)) (¯ ti−cD
i (2),¯ tj −cE
j (1)) (¯ ti−cD
i (2),¯ tj −cE
j (2))
The ﬁrst side condition indicates that action choices are determined interactively
between agents. This disciplines the agent on the demanding task in a way which
is not possible in the single agent case. Moreover, the principal has substantial
inﬂuenceonthestructureofthegame. Inparticular, shecandisentangleincentives
for the two tasks by setting the transfers to agent i, ti and ¯ ti, different from those to
agent j, t j and ¯ tj. Exploiting this opportunity, it is possible to implement efﬁcient
production.
11Proposition 3 (Implementation efﬁcient production). If agents specialise (i 6= j),
transfers can be chosen such that the efﬁcient production (eD
i = 1,eE
j = 1) can
be implemented as a Nash-equilibrium. The respective transfers need to fulﬁl the
conditions:
¯ ti−ti ≥ cD(1)−cD
i (0) and ¯ tj−t j ≥ cE
j (1)−cE
j (0). (9)
Proof. Set transfers such that ¯ ti−cD(1) ≥ti−cD
i (0) and ¯ tj −t j ≥ cE
j (1)−cE
j (0).
Assume division of labour (i 6= j). Next, verify that under these transfers and with
division of labour, (eD
i = 1,eE
j = 1) is a Nash-equilibrium. If agent i moves to
a higher level, it just increases costs, if he moves to a lower level a low result is
produced, and by ¯ ti−cD(1)≥ti−cD
i (0), agent i gets a lower utility. Thus, i has no
incentive to deviate. For agent j, moving to a higher level only increases costs and





j = 1) is a Nash-equilibrium.
The conditions on transfers in this proposition mean that the bonus for a good
looking product needs to be sufﬁciently large to entice agents to carry out the
more costly medium effort. By setting separate transfers the principal gains an
extra degree of freedom in designing an optimal performance contract. In particu-
lar she can set the gains from effort separately for each task and obtain the desired
effort at each of the two tasks. As there is no other motive to separate tasks, the
beneﬁt of division of labour is entirely due to improved incentives.
The proposition also holds for continuous efforts. Then, as before, the division of
labour enables the principal to set incentives separately for tasks and she can pre-
cisely determine the effort level at each task – now by altering the marginal gains.
If the production result is noisy and agents are risk averse, it will not be possible
to obtain efﬁcient production anymore. By dividing labour, however, the principal
can still inﬂuence the allocation of effort across tasks and improve efﬁciency.
When labour is divided, an agent’s decision on how much effort to exert depends
on what the other agent chooses. This interaction creates a positive externality
between the two agents: if an agent exerts high effort instead of medium effort,
he allows the other agent to slack on his task. By slacking the other agent can
increase his payoff. So, the ﬁrst agent creates a positive externality for the second
agent. However, this externality is not internalised by the ﬁrst agent: he would
get the same transfer as by exerting medium effort (the result does not change),
12but would incur higher costs. He would not beneﬁt from the cost savings of the
second agent. Hence efﬁcient production can be implemented because agents do
not consider all payoff consequences of their actions.
The idea of inducing an externality to solve an incentive problem is also present in
Dewatripont’s and Tirole’s paper on advocates (1999). But in their context an ad-
vocate who increases effort imposes a negative externality on his colleague, who,
as a consequence, is less likely to win the case. Unlike in our setting, task separa-
tion generates competition in the case considered by Dewatripont and Tirole. This
also means that sabotage becomes an option between advocates whereas there is
no role for sabotage in our model: an agent who successfully sabotages his col-
league jeopardises the production result and hence reduces his own payoff.
Even if we have chosen transfers to implement efﬁcient production, it is not obvi-
ous that window dressing is not an equilibrium at the same time. The next result
addresses this problem.
Theorem1(Preventionofwindowdressing). Ifagentsspecialise(i6= j), transfers
can be chosen such that “cheap” window dressing (eD
i = 0,eE
j = 2) as well as
“expensive” window dressing (eD
i = 2,eE
j = 0) can be prevented while efﬁcient
production (eD
i = 1,eE
j = 1) is a Nash-equilibrium. The respective transfers need
to fulﬁl the conditions:
cD
i (2)−cD
















j (1) ≥ ¯ tj −t j ≥ cE
j (1)−cE
j (0). Note, that this is possible because of the “con-
vexity” in costs expressed in inequality (1). Then, neither cheap nor expensive
window dressing can be a Nash-equilibrium because agent j can proﬁtably devi-
ate under cheap window dressing to a lower effort while agent i has an incentive
to choose a lower effort under expensive window dressing. At the same time,
transfers fulﬁl the condition from Proposition 3 and thus ensure that efﬁcient pro-
duction is a Nash equilibrium.
Window dressing can be prevented because the bonus for a good looking product
is too low for high effort to be worthwhile. Setting the bonus in this way is possi-
ble because of the convexity of costs in effort.
13Theorem 1 allows us to rule out window dressing as an equilibrium. Does this
mean that efﬁcient production can be implemented as the unique equilibrium?
Unfortunately not: the low effort production (eD
i = 0,eE
j = 0) is also an equilib-
rium and cannot be eliminated at the same time as window dressing. However,
this result can be regarded as an artifact of the very limited nature of the mea-
sure. Suppose the measure is less abrupt and takes on a third value, say 0.5, for
(eD
i = 0,eE
j = 1). Then, we could design a contract which destabilises the low
effort equilibrium by making a switch to the middle effort for agent j sufﬁciently
attractive. At the same time, agent i would be unaffected and efﬁcient production
would remain an equilibrium.
We have shown that it is possible to implement efﬁcient production (eD
i = 1,eE
j =
1) by separating tasks. But will this lead to the efﬁcient surplus? The answer
depends on the availability of agents. If there is an abundant supply of equally
able agents, the principal will hire a second agent and ask him to take over one
task. Division of labour will occur merely for incentive reasons because agents
are equally able and costs are additive. If employing the second agent involves
no hiring costs, the efﬁcient surplus can be obtained. When there is no abundant
supply of equally able agents or hiring additional agents leads to some other form
of costs, the principal is willing to bear these costs as long as the beneﬁt b is suf-
ﬁciently large. Thus, one might observe that the principal hires a less productive
or otherwise costly agent to increase efﬁciency – although the same visible result
could be produced more cheaply by a single agent.
Efﬁcient production is achieved while the production technology remained the
same. Also, the only veriﬁable result of production has not changed. What is
crucial is that the principal employs two agents instead of one. Thus efﬁcient
production may no longer be possible if the two agents act as if they were one
agent. In other words, the two agents might collude and thereby undermine the
incentive scheme. This problem is explored in the following section.
4 Collusion
Before dealing with collusion, we want to be more speciﬁc about the ability of
different agents. Inequality (3) implied that the demanding task has always higher
“marginal” costs. We take this to be a general property of the production tech-
nology that cannot be altered by hiring different agents. We thus assume the fol-
14lowing generalisation of inequality (3) for the case where differently able agents
work at the two tasks:
cD
i (1)−cD
i (0) > cE
j (1)−cE
j (0) and cD
i (2)−cD
i (1) > cE
j (2)−cE
j (1). (11)
In other words, there is no agent i who ﬁnds it easier to increase effort on the de-
manding task than another agent j who wants to increase effort on the easy task by
a similar amount. We also maintain that any agent working alone prefers window
dressing to selecting efﬁcient levels, that is inequality (2) holds.
Within these restrictions imposed by the production technology, there is still scope
for agents to differ. We call the population of agents heterogeneous, if there is a
pair of agents i and j such that the increase of effort at the demanding task by
agent i at a low level is less costly than the increase in effort at the easy task by
agent j at a high level: cD
i (1)−cD
i (0) < cH
j (2)−cD
j (1). This deﬁnition allows us
to make a general claim about the consequences of collusion.
Collusion is only possible if the agents have a larger contract space than the prin-
cipal: they need to be able to formally or informally contract on the easy task –
for example the team might engage in repeated interactions while the principal
is replaced.4 We follow Tirole (1986) and model collusion as an enforceable side
contract between agents. We assume that agents learn each others productivity
when being paired. This facilitates collusion because agents are not required to
extract information from each other.
Theorem 2 (Preventing collusion). If agents can collude, efﬁcient production can
be implemented if and only if the population is heterogeneous.
Proof. To simulate collusion, assume agents could secretly contract on eE
i and eD
i .
By Theorem 1, a transfer scheme with cD
i (2)−cD





j (1) ≥ ¯ tj −t j ≥ cE
j (1)−cE
j (0) yields efﬁcient production in absence of
collusion. Themostproﬁtabledeviationwhichagentsmayachievejointlyiseither
the cheap or the expensive window-dressing. As the superﬁcial appearance does
not change (M =1), the sum of transfers received by the agents remains the same.

















4Roy (1952) reports on the workers’ behaviour in a production line where workers were able
to enforce effort levels in order to restrict joint output, while the employer was unable observe it.





j (0) < 0. The deviation to cheap window dressing




j (2). This number is larger than zero
when the population is not heterogeneous. If, however, an agent pair (i, j) ex-




j (1) > 0, the principal can assign i to
the demanding task and j to the less demanding task and rule out any proﬁtable
deviations from efﬁcient production.
The intuition behind this result is that by assigning agents with different produc-
tivities to tasks, the principal is able to affect the costs of collusion. If the agent
on the difﬁcult task is particularly productive and his colleague on the easy task
sufﬁciently unproductive, collusion simply does not pay for them; the gains from
slacking on the difﬁcult task by the productive agent are more than outweighed
by the loss of more effort by the unproductive agent on the easy task. Again, this
intuition also works for continuous effort (where being productive means having
lower marginal costs) and is independent from the speciﬁc nature of the observ-
able production result.
Theorem 2 shows that collusion leading to window dressing can be prevented by a
particular form of division of labour if agents have different (marginal) production
costs.5 Thisrequiresthatamarginallylessproductiveagent j ishiredandassigned
to the easy task. Unlike in the previous section, where we did not consider collu-
sion, there is now a clear optimal assignment of agents to tasks. Consequently, it
might not be possible to assign agents to the task where they have a comparative
advantage. Accordingly, a seemingly inefﬁcient assignment may be the only way
to avoid collusion.
While before, the principal preferred to hire two equally able agents, the possi-
bility of collusion changes this. Even if there is abundant supply of productive
agents, the principal now has to employ a less able agent because it is the only
way to prevent collusion. It is worth noting that if the incentive scheme induces a
negative externality, like in Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), it is always vulnerable
to collusion – even if agents differ in productivity. In our case, this is not true. We
5Here is an example of a simple cost function which fulﬁls all assumptions. Effort takes the
values e = 0, 1
2,1. Costs are αce2 where c = 1 for the demanding task and c = 1
4 for the easy task.
Set α = 1 for an agent j. Suppose there is another agent i with α ∈ (1
4, 3
4). Then, collusion can be
prevented. If agent i is too productive α < 1
4 expensive window dressing becomes a problem; if
α > 3
4, the gains of cheap window dressing become too attractive.
16have just seen that internalising the externality by collusion is not enough when
agents productivities differ in a particular way.
If the principal wants to assign productive agents to the difﬁcult task and less
productive agents to the easy task, she has to know their productivity. What if
this information is not available? Will agents sort themselves to the adequate
task? The principal can stop productive agents from applying for the easy task if
there is a premium for the difﬁcult task which outweighs the gains of collusion
from choosing the easy task. Will unproductive agents then apply for the difﬁcult
task to obtain the premium? The principal could ask the agent on the easy task
whether his colleague on the difﬁcult task is productive or not, take his report to
be true and re-assign agents appropriately. This shifts all bargaining power to the
agent on the easy task, who can hold the agent on the difﬁcult task down to the
outside option and appropriate any rents. If an unproductive agent went for the
difﬁcult task in the hope to capture the premium for this task, he will be held up
and loose this premium to the agent on the easy task who threatens to denounce
him. Thus, an unproductive agent has no reason to select the “wrong” task. Of
course, the agent on the easy task can also hold a productive agent down to the
outside option. However, this outside option is not lower than the current gains
of the productive agent, so the payoff to him is not altered by the denunciation,
there is no rent to be appropriated, and the agent on the easy task has no reason
to denounce. So, even in an environment where the principal knows little about
the costs of the workers, the division of labour prevents collusion and helps to
overcome incentive problems.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that splitting a production process and assigning tasks to different
agents can help to improve incentives. More speciﬁcally, we examined a situation
where the only veriﬁable result confounds the input of different tasks. Then, hav-
ing many “specialised” agents allows to better inﬂuence inputs on each task and
hence ensures a more efﬁcient production than with few and unspecialised agents.
Efﬁcient production is achieved merely by increasing the number of agents, as-
signing them tasks and preventing them from doing the tasks of other agents; the
productiontechnologyandthenatureoftheperformancemeasurearenotaffected.
In other words, a larger number of agents is now remunerated on the basis of the
same joint outcome.
17Our analysis presents two main insights. First, it supplies an argument for divi-
sion of labour in settings where a single worker can use different aspects of the
work to enhance appearance without improving the substance. We show that by
employing additional workers and separating tasks amongst them, this opportu-
nity is eliminated and incentives are improved. We thus provide an explanation
for specialisation which complements the classical idea of comparative advantage.
This has consequences for the literature on job enrichment and enlargement. In
this literature a wider job description is thought to be advantageous because it re-
duces coordination and communication problems (see e.g. Becker and Murphy
1992 or Bolton and Dewatripont 1994), because there are task complementarities
(Lindbeck and Snower 2000), or because workers like variation (costs are convex
and additive separable between tasks, see e.g. Itoh 1992). These advantages of
job enrichment are usually traded off against the advantage of specialisation put
forward by Adam Smith. Lindbeck and Snower (2000) argue that new versatile
technologies which make workplaces more ﬂexible (such as computers) reduce
the beneﬁt of speciﬁc investments to improve performance on a task and thus di-
minish the gains from specialisation. Accordingly, the advantages of job enrich-
ment become relatively more important and modern production processes should
be less divided. Here, we have shown that there are other beneﬁts of dividing
labour. These beneﬁts do not necessarily decrease when a new more versatile
technology is introduced. In fact, if the new technology makes it more difﬁcult to
identify task-wise contributions, it may actually be advantageous to partition the
production process more ﬁnely.
Division of labour is helpful in our setting because workers do not consider all
payoff consequences of their actions. They fail to take into account the externality
which they create for coworkers. A similar argument is also used by Dewatripont
and Tirole (1999), who show that division of labour can help in delivering in-
centives because it allows to create competition between agents. In their setting,
separation of tasks creates a negative externality: greater effort on one task creates
a disservice for the other, competing agent. In our context involved parties are not
working against each other. The division of labour creates a positive externality,
in that greater effort on one task gives the opportunity to slack on the other task.
While the negative externality in the tournament-type setting of Dewatripont and
Tirole (1999) invites sabotage activities, there is no reason why workers would
engage in such activities in our setting.
18Both settings are vulnerable to collusion: if workers are able to collude, they inter-
nalise the externality. However, and this is our second main insight, while it is not
possible to prevent workers from colluding and shirking when the externality is
negative, in our context collusion can be prevented by hiring agents with different
productivities. We show that by employing a less productive worker on the easy
task, the employer can ensure efﬁcient production. Deviating from the desired
way of producing is simply too expensive for the workers. This implies that the
principal may hire less productive workers even if more productive workers are
available.
Our ﬁrst main ﬁnding explains the incidence of “over”-specialisation: production
is broken down to very small tasks which are carried out by different workers
while some of them could easily be carried out by the same worker. Considering
hiring costs, coordination costs, etc., this seems inefﬁcient. However, it might be
advisable in order to ensure that the desired amount of effort is exerted at each
task. The second main ﬁnding relates to a seemingly wrong job assignment: to
prevent collusion some tasks are deliberately assigned to workers who are not
particularly good at them. Both aspects, “over”-specialisation and “wrong” job
assignment, are often associated with bureaucracies. Prendergast (2003) pointed
out that bureaucracies may be seen as an optimal incentive solution to a speciﬁc
contractual environment. Here, we show that Prendergast’s observation can be
extended to hiring decisions and work assignment in bureaucracies for the very
same reason: the optimal provision of incentives.
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